| Recent press reports have described instances of countries using intentional uplink jamming to attack and deny transponded satellite communications (SATCOM) links. The United States military relies heavily on leased commercial SATCOM links. According to Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, defensive counterspace (DCS) operations are used to deter and defend against attacks and to continue operations by limiting the effectiveness of hostile action against US space assets and forces.
In the Joint Expeditionary Forces Experiment 2004 (JEFX 04), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) sponsored the SATCOM Interference Response System (SIRS) DCS initiative. SIRS demonstrated the ability to passively monitor critical transponded SATCOM links; detect, characterize, and geolocate interference to those SATCOM links; remotely display interference information; and couple the interfering emitter geolocation information to the Combined Air Operations Center’s Time Critical Targeting process as a way of neutralizing hostile SATCOM interference. The purpose of the SIRS initiative was to demonstrate DCS technology, develop tactics, techniques, and procedures, and reduce risk for Rapid Attack Identification, Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS), the Air Force’s DCS program of record.
The SIRS initiative assessed well and received JEFX 04 Transition Funds to support the rapid fielding of interim SIRS capabilities to the warfighter in the period before RAIDRS is available. Even before the JEFX 04-funded SIRS systems were available, AFSPC responded to an urgent, real world warfighter request for SIRS capabilities.
This paper provides a brief overview of the SIRS technology, the JEFX 04 results, the AFSPC response to the warfighter request, and recent operational experience.
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